The Liberal State\u27s Response to Religious Visions of Education by James G. Dwyer
Journal of Catholic Legal Studies 
Volume 44 
Number 1 Volume 44, 2005, Number 1 Article 11 
April 2016 
The Liberal State's Response to Religious Visions of Education 
James G. Dwyer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcls 
 Part of the Catholic Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James G. Dwyer (2005) "The Liberal State's Response to Religious Visions of Education," Journal of 
Catholic Legal Studies: Vol. 44 : No. 1 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcls/vol44/iss1/11 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Catholic Legal Studies by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE LIBERAL STATE'S RESPONSE TO
RELIGIOUS VISIONS OF EDUCATION
JAMES G. DWYER
The principal papers in this symposium offer a rich account
of religious perspectives on education. They impress on the
reader the great variety of views across and within religious
traditions. Significantly, each of the authors, to varying degrees,
emphasizes that many people, within the particular religious
tradition he or she addresses, and in some cases institutional
authorities as well, embrace liberal educational aims. Some go so
far as to assert or imply that liberal educational practices
predominate within a tradition.
Liberal educational practices, as articulated by certain
liberal political theorists,' include not just developing basic
skills-such as reading, writing, and arithmetic-and providing
information in a variety of subject areas. They also include
developing advanced intellectual skills, such as critical and
independent thinking, problem solving, investigative methods in
the sciences and humanities, and synthesis of complex
information. They include instruction in broader principles and
theories in various subject areas and, at some level of schooling,
open debate about the validity of the principles and the
soundness of the theories. They encourage creativity and
original thinking. At appropriate developmental stages, they
expose students to competing views, secular and religious, on
contested issues in the various academic disciplines and in public
policy, and they afford children a substantial measure of freedom
of expression to deliberate about the respective merits of the
competing views, while at the same time expecting students to
articulate reasons for their own positions, whether they conform
t Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
See HARRY BRIGHOUSE, SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1-18 (2000)
(discussing the interplay between liberalism and educational policy). See generally
MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION (1999) (discussing
liberalism and the modification of the liberal education ideal, and proposing steps to
implement an autonomy-promoting liberal education).
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with mainstream views or not. In these and other ways, liberal
educators treat children with respect as unique, valuable, and
equal persons. Liberals endorse this type of education because
they believe it is most conducive to giving children an
opportunity for enjoying a happy and fulfilling life, as well as
being a requisite for becoming autonomous. Some liberals also,
or instead, emphasize that this type of education is most
conducive to children becoming good citizens in a liberal
democracy.
Two things are significant about the other participants'
efforts to portray attitudes toward children's schooling among
members of particular religious groups as largely liberal. One is
that they are unsupported; the authors do not cite empirical
studies showing what portion of people or what percentage of
schools within a religious group hold to certain beliefs about
children's education. To the best of my knowledge, there are no
such studies. Thus, quantitative claims about the degree to
which liberal or illiberal views prevail in the educational
philosophy or classroom instruction of any religious group today
really cannot be supported. I return to this point below.
The second way in which the emphasis on liberal views is
significant is that the authors offer no explanation for it-that is,
for why they believe it is important that many people within a
faith hold relatively liberal views, or why they think this should
be of interest to their readers, including those outside the faith
they examine. What business is it of the other authors or of their
audience whether most Muslims or Jews or Christians in the
United States or elsewhere provide children in the schools they
operate with a liberal education, an illiberal education, an
exclusively religious education, or any other kind of education?
So long as they are not encouraging children to engage in
violence or other harmful conduct, and so long as they are not
producing graduates incapable of being self-sufficient, why
should any other private party or the state care what or how they
teach the children or presume to pass judgment on them? Yet
one gets the sense from each paper that the author is valorizing
liberal approaches to education, and it would have been of
interest for them to explain how they would respond to a
defender of illiberal childrearing practices who charged them
with failing to respect the entitlement of all parents to raise their
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children as their convictions instruct them, without critical
scrutiny from presumptuous academics.
Also of significance in the principal papers is that none of the
authors deny that there are some schools within the faith
tradition he or she addresses that follow illiberal practices, such
as discouraging children from thinking critically and
independently; stifling self-expression and any inclination to
question the received wisdom in the sciences, in the humanities,
or in the religious tradition; and imposing gender-stereotyped
roles on students. At least two of the authors, Professors
Afsaruddin and Smolin, explicitly acknowledge that there are
illiberal elements within the groups they describe. Yet this
acknowledgment is left to recede into the background, not
followed by serious consideration of whether someone should do
something about the existence of any such schools, or of whether
the children subjected to illiberal schooling have some claim on
the rest of society that we are failing to recognize. At best, some
of the other authors endeavor just to convince readers that
illiberal practices are not too widespread.
My own interest is in questions of political theory raised by
the existence of any schools with illiberal practices-that is,
questions concerning the state's stance toward illiberal schooling.
I am curious about the content and style of theological arguments
and analyses concerning child rearing, but I am not competent to
enter into them, so I confine myself to writing about how the
state should respond to them. I approach these questions as a
legal academic with an increasingly tenuous claim also to be a
political philosopher. I approach them, moreover, as an advocate
for children, a sincere and well-intentioned one, but by no means
an omniscient one. From the latter perspective, I assume that
the life of each child matters morally and therefore that the rest
of us, and by implication the state as our agent, should be
concerned about any harmful childrearing practices, even if they
affect only one child. Thus, it is irrelevant from my perspective
whether most or only a few children within Islam, Judaism,
Catholicism, or Evangelical Christianity, in the United States or
elsewhere, receive a form of schooling that is contrary to some of
their interests.2
2 For the same reason, I deem it irrelevant to state regulatory decision making
what standardized tests-even if they were designed to detect the more important
aspects of a liberal education identified above, which they are not-reveal about
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In my book, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights, published
in 1998, I summarized the empirical research on Catholic and
conservative Christian schools that had been done up to that
point and noted that the record was scant and dated; there
simply had not been much study of those schools, especially not
in recent years.3 This was itself significant to my mind, that the
state did not take enough interest in the quality of education
received by the 10 percent of children who do not attend public
schools to examine closely the practices of private schools.
However, what studies had been done by outside observers were
more or less consistent in identifying illiberal practices in some
schools, and I suggested in the book that even this scant and
dated record should be enough to make the state and the public
take notice precisely because every child matters-no child
should be left behind." At a minimum, it seemed it should induce
states to do some independent investigation of their own to either
confirm or refute the depictions in these studies.
There is no reason to believe today that illiberal schooling
practices have disappeared, given that much of American society,
and much of Evangelical Christianity in particular, appears to
have moved in a more conservative direction in the past decade.
Illiberal attitudes manifested by the leadership of the Southern
Baptist Convention, which represents at least 15 million
Americans, and of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary,
surely receive support from and filter back down to a large
segment of the population. These attitudes include opposition to
women assuming leadership roles and a determination to stifle
those who would question this or other positions of the
leadership.' Presumably, such discriminatory and authoritarian
average student performance in different categories of schools such as private versus
public. It is no more logical to conclude from comparable outcomes in those two
sectors that all is well in all private schools than it is to conclude that all is well in
all public schools.
3 JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 13-14 (1998).
4 See id. at 7-44.
5 See BATTLE FOR THE MINDS (New Day Films 1996) (depicting the conservative
takeover of the Convention and the Seminary in a documentary film); see also BARRY
HANKINS, UNEASY IN BABYLON: SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONSERVATIVES AND AMERICAN
CULTURE 200-39 (2002); JULIE INGERSOLL, EVANGELICAL CHRISTIAN WOMEN: WAR
STORIES IN THE GENDER BATTLES 47-59 (2003); CARL L. KELL & L. RAYMOND CAMP,
IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER: THE RHETORIC OF THE NEW SOUTHERN BAPTIST
CONVENTION 77-96 (1999); DAVID T. MORGAN, SOUTHERN BAPTIST SISTERS: IN
SEARCH OF STATUS, 1845-2000, at 160-62 (2003); JERRY SUTTON, THE BAPTIST
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attitudes influence the pedagogical approaches and curricular
content of some schools that Evangelical Christians operate.
6
The Catholic Church and Catholic schooling in the United
States have gone through significant changes in recent decades
towards a more liberal approach from all appearances.7 There
might, therefore, be little for liberals to be concerned about today
with respect to Catholic schooling, though the fact that the
Church is still characterized by quite visible de jure patriarchy
suggests at least some lingering cause for concern about what
children in Catholic schools learn about gender equality. My
perception is that there are still archly conservative groups
within Judaism and Islam in the United States that operate
schools characterized by pronounced gender discrimination and a
pedagogical approach antithetical to development toward moral
autonomy. Again, though, it is irrelevant to an analysis of the
state's responsibility to children whether there are thousands of
schools with illiberal practices or only a few, and I doubt that any
reasonable and informed person would claim that there are no
such schools.
In my first book, I also expressed the view that it is
irrelevant to an analysis of the state's responsibility to children
whether schools that have some harmful practices also provide
things for children that the state deems valuable.' To take an
extreme and, so far as I know, entirely hypothetical example, one
might imagine a school that does all of the things I listed above
as constitutive of a liberal education, but in which teachers and
administrators routinely sexually abuse children. Surely we
would all say that the state should stop the sexual abuse and not
refrain from doing so because the school is otherwise providing a
good education. So, in my view, it was enough to generate a
REFORMATION: THE CONSERVATIVE RESURGENCE IN THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST
CONVENTION 259-61 (2000).
6 See FRANCES R.A. PATERSON, DEMOCRACY AND INTOLERANCE: CHRISTIAN
SCHOOL CURRICULA, SCHOOL CHOICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 14-21 (2003).
' See generally CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AT THE CROSSROADS: SURVIVAL AND
TRANSFORMATION (James Youniss & John J. Convey eds., 2000) (containing various
essays on contemporary changes in modern Catholic education); THE
CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC SCHOOL: CONTEXT, IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY (Terence H.
McLaughlin et al. eds., 1996) (including various essays regarding the context,
identity, and progression of Catholic schools); ANDREW M. GREELEY, THE CATHOLIC
REVOLUTION: NEW WINE, OLD WINESKINS, AND THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL
(2003).
8 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 15.
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philosophical analysis of the state's responsibility to the children
in private schools if there was reason to believe that at least one
private school in the country was engaging in at least one
practice that the state believed to be harmful.
I also deemed irrelevant what goes on in nonreligious
schools, including public schools. 9 To return to the extreme
hypothetical example above, if the state became aware of routine
sexual abuse in a particular religious school, it would clearly be
inappropriate for the state to say, "we have no business worrying
about those children, because there are some public schools
where this goes on as well." Looked at another way, it should be
no defense for the administrators of the religious school to say,
"some public schools do this, so we should be free to do so until
you stop them." If the state deems certain practices harmful to
children, then of course it should endeavor to eliminate them
from all public schools, but I cannot imagine a sound argument
for the conclusion that until it does so completely, the state must
ignore the situation of children in private schools.
But why was I personally interested in what might seem to
be a relatively minor social problem, if it is a problem at all, in a
world where large numbers of children suffer from poverty,
physical abuse, parental drug addiction, value-destroying
television programming, and unhealthy diets? One reason was
that questions about the state's stance toward childrearing
practices it deems harmful, when the practices are motivated by
religious conviction, provide a great intellectual challenge. No
one should act as if the answers are simple and as if anyone who
does not agree with them is simpleminded or malicious. At
times, my own writing on the subject has had a polemical tone to
it, and I regret that. As noted below, personal experience also
motivated my interest in the topic, and that personal experience
included inculcation of dogmatic attitudes. These questions were
sufficiently difficult to answer, that they preoccupied many
political theorists throughout the 1990s, and no clear consensus
emerged. I found much of the analysis of those questions to be
misguided, and I thought that I had something different and
better to say, principally concerning the rights-based arguments
that were often made. I addressed my own arguments to liberal
political theorists, and I did not expect that anyone not operating
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from the perspective of liberal political theory would find much in
it persuasive. I am very glad to have the opportunity now, in this
journal, to address a readership that I assume to have a
primarily religious orientation, though this is not incompatible
with also endorsing or operating within the perspective of liberal
political theory. I will endeavor to speak more directly to
thoughts and concerns that the readers of this journal might
have, while recognizing that I likely will not address them all
and that I might still be unpersuasive.
Another reason why this topic interested me, if I might wax
autobiographical for a paragraph, is that I spent seventeen years
in Catholic educational institutions: a preschool at a convent, a
parochial elementary school, a diocesan high school, and a Jesuit
university. I had some thoughts afterward about the quality of
the education I received and about the ways in which teachers
and administrators treated pupils in the elementary and
secondary schools I attended, some positive thoughts and some
negative. Working through a philosophical analysis of the legal
environment in which those schools operated was one way of
expressing and working through these thoughts. These thoughts
were tied to others about being raised in a staunchly
conservative Catholic family, in a pervasively Catholic
community, and about my own intense experience with
Catholicism throughout my childhood, adolescence, and early
adulthood, an experience that led me in my early twenties to a
decision, later reversed, that I would enter the priesthood.
Because of these experiences with Catholicism, I thought I might
be able to offer something to the debate among liberal political
theorists that few others could-namely, the perspective of
someone who was raised in a pervasive and illiberal religious
environment and who was once deeply immersed in Christian
faith and theology. I cannot say that many, or any, other
political theorists are "a product of an intellectual formation
largely ignorant of the substantial Christian intellectual
heritage" or are incapable of understanding "how any intelligent
person of good will can be either a traditionalist Catholic or
Evangelical Christian," as Professor Smolin charges, ° but I can
say that neither is true of me.
'0 David M. Smolin, Religion, Education, and the Theoretically Liberal State:
Contrasting Evangelical and Secularist Perspectives, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 99
(2005).
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What then to make of schools that, as a direct outgrowth of
the sincere religious beliefs of their operators and of the parents
that patronize them, reject liberal educational aims and/or
engage in practices like sexist teaching that liberals believe
harmful to children? The adults involved presumably care about
the children, want the best for them, and are doing the best they
can by their own lights. Are they entitled to be left alone, absent
infliction of grievous physical harm on the children, as a matter
of religious freedom or parental rights? Or does the state have a
right to insist that all children receive more or less the same kind
of schooling, a right based perhaps on a perceived need to
produce a certain kind of citizen to populate and support a
particular kind of society? Or do children have any claims on
their parents or on the state to ensure that they receive a
particular sort of education and are not treated in certain ways?
One general approach to answering these questions might be
to consult one's own ethical convictions, which for most people in
the United States would be tied to religious beliefs. As a political
philosopher, though, what interests me is not what personal
opinions I or anyone else might form about these questions on
the basis of religious conviction or any other set of beliefs, but
rather how legal decision makers should answer them. This
latter inquiry should interest everyone, including those who
ordinarily think about children's upbringing exclusively within
the framework of their own religious faith. For ultimately the
state must answer these questions, and its answers to them must
be what determines whether illiberal schools are able to continue
operating as they have. A fatal weakness in much of the
theorizing and rhetoric about legal conflicts over illiberal child-
rearing practices is the failure to recognize this-the failure to
see that the state is inevitably pervasively involved in the lives of
children and other non-autonomous persons. How other people
treat children and what practical authority anyone has over the
lives of children must be governed by laws, and it is the state
that creates laws. All participants in debates over these conflicts
are demanding some kind of legal rule. Defenders of freedom for
parents and religious communities are asking that the state
confer a particular set of legal rights on parents and
communities, a right to direct children's lives as they wish.
Whatever moral rights or natural rights they might believe they
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possess, in practice what they need and want to raise children as
they wish are state-created legal rights.
Thus, what opponents of regulation and oversight of
religious childrearing practices are really demanding is not state
inaction, as is sometimes suggested, but rather a different form
of state action, a conferral on them of broader legal authority
over the lives of children. For the state truly to "stay out of child
rearing" would mean no regulatory oversight of private schools or
other sites of child rearing, but it would also mean that no adults
have any legal basis for retaining custody of or control over any
children, and so could claim no protection against any efforts by
other private parties or by the children themselves to interfere
with their efforts to direct the children's lives. All children would
be up for grabs, susceptible to the influence and even physical
possession of any adult able to come into contact with them.
Surely this is not what anyone wants. No one truly wants the
state to stay out of child rearing. What everyone wants is that
the state govern child rearing in a particular way, assigning
custody to particular adults and conferring some degree of power
to direct a child's upbringing on those adults. Disagreement
turns principally on how much power the state should give those
adults and, conversely, how much power it should assign to other
private parties or retain in its own agencies. Whatever one's
position, it is a position about what the state should do and about
what laws should exist. As such, arguments for it must be
addressed to the state and must be ones that the state can adopt
for itself.
What then should the state make of these various religious
visions of education? How, if at all, should awareness of those
visions influence state decision making? As an initial matter, I
believe that the readers of this journal will agree that the state in
this nation may not adopt one of those religious visions per se as
its own. In other words, a legislature may not declare that
henceforth its educational policy will be dictated by the teachings
of the Catholic Church or by the Koran. This would be so even if
all the members of a legislature were themselves Catholics or
Muslims. In their jobs as legislators, they are agents for the
entire populace, and the populace is heterogeneous with respect
to religious belief, with a significant percentage of the population
being nonreligious. In recognition of this ideological diversity,
and of the fact that life goes better for everyone when the state
20051
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takes no side in disputations over religious questions, we in
America have created and continue to endorse a so-called
"secular state," meaning at least a state that is not affiliated with
any religious institution and that does not endorse particular
religious beliefs per se or take positions on religious questions.
This does not make the liberal state value-neutral, but the state
compensates for its adopting a secular rather than theocratic
character by leaving substantial space in private life for persons
of faith to direct their own lives by their own lights.
Does this mean that state actors must, in their deliberations
and decision making, entirely ignore statements of a religious
vision of education? No. Does it mean that state actors must
assume that children have no spiritual interests and should not
be taught religious beliefs? No. What it means is simply that
state actors are constrained to make decisions about what laws
will govern children's lives on bases other than religious belief.
In doing so, they certainly may take into account that most
citizens, including most of the adults upon whom the state has
conferred the status of legal parenthood, have religious beliefs,
including beliefs that children have spiritual interests of a
particular sort. But in their official capacity, state actors may
not themselves assume that any of those beliefs are true and, on
that basis, act in accordance with them. If they did so they would
of course have to pick and choose, and any selected beliefs would
conflict with others that some persons hold fervently. This might
inhibit the religious freedom or sense of belonging of those
persons. Selected beliefs might also conflict with the beliefs that
today's children will hold later in their lives. State actors must
instead seek out and base their decisions about laws and policies
on secular values and beliefs." Among those secular values
would be life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And among
those secular beliefs would be an understanding that most people
place great importance on religious freedom among all the
liberties, and that experiences of spirituality and religious
devotion produce great happiness for many people.
If what is at issue were simply how adults should conduct
their own lives, state decision makers would not have much
difficulty in establishing basic rules of conduct. Based on
" I consider below the fact that these values and beliefs are not universal, and
the fact that some so-called secular values might be tied to, and even originate in,
religious belief.
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reasoning of the sort John Stuart Mill offered for maximizing
human happiness or the reasoning of the sort John Locke and, in
our own day, John Rawls presented for respecting the autonomy
of persons, state actors would establish a scheme of legally
protected, extensive personal liberty in matters of religious belief
and exercise. That liberty would be limited only to the extent
necessary to ensure that all autonomous persons, as moral
equals, enjoy an equal measure of liberty, and to prevent persons
from inflicting tangible harms on others. This is, more or less,
the scheme that the United States Supreme Court has fashioned
over time in its First Amendment jurisprudence. Difficulty
arises at the margins, especially where there is disagreement
about what constitutes harm to others and where specific
religious beliefs or practices conflict with public projects like
eradicating drug use or building roads. 12  For the most part
though, the boundaries of religious freedom outside the context of
child rearing are well established and uncontroversial, and the
vast majority of Americans are able to exercise their religious
beliefs without ever coming into conflict with other private
parties or the state.
The problem in the context of education is that child rearing
is not about adults conducting just their own lives. It is about
their directing the lives of children. So then the question arises
as to how the state should view children-as equivalent or
analogous to property or appendages of parents, or as separate
persons. If the former, then child rearing might not require a
different kind of analysis or set of legal rules relative to those
pertaining to adults' self-determination. Parents might have the
legal power to do whatever they want with children so long as
they do not cause harm to persons outside the family. But if the
latter is true, serious thought would need to be given to the
implications of children's separate personhood, including
whether parental behavior toward children should be treated in
some ways like adults' behavior in relation to persons who are
12 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (rejecting a free-
exercise challenge to the denial of unemployment benefits to Native Americans fired
for ingesting peyote in violation of state law); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988) (rejecting a Native American tribe's free
exercise challenge to the U.S. Forest Service's construction of a logging road through
land sacred to the tribe).
2005]
206 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 44:195
not "their" children, such as other competent adults, incompetent
adults, and other children.
It would certainly be easier to answer the question of
children's status as property or persons if one could appeal to a
clear statement on the issue from some authoritative text. In
some religious traditions there might be some statement of this
sort in a religious text. But the question here is how the state
should view children, and even on so fundamental a question as
who has personhood status in our society, we should all be
uncomfortable about state actors adopting a religious authority
as their own, even if today it would be a religious authority that
we personally share. We should be uncomfortable about it not
only because tomorrow it might be a religious authority that we
do not share and that takes a position directly contrary to our
own convictions, including one that excludes us from the category
of persons, but also because of the impact it would likely have on
some fellow members of our society who are from a different
religious tradition and whose equal personhood and citizenship
we respect. We should all prefer that the state appeal to some
nonreligious basis for taking a position on the status of children
and other beings, including ourselves, at least so long as that
basis generates conclusions not too dissimilar from our personal
views. But what if there is no other basis? There is certainly no
statement on the issue in our written social contract-that is, the
Constitution. Where else is a legislator to look?
In a forthcoming book, I develop a nonreligious account of
children's moral status that the state could endorse, by
cataloging the characteristics of beings that ordinarily cause
human moral agents to have basic intuitions that other beings
matter morally.13 I conclude on that basis that the moral status
of children, in general, is actually higher than that of adults, and,
accordingly, that their interests should receive greater weight in
our moral deliberations than those of adults. This is consistent
with the intuition that many parents have with respect to their
own children, that their children's interests matter more morally
than do their own, and my analysis would generate a similar
view at a collective, societal level. I cannot reproduce that
analysis here, and I would not claim that it is likely to convince
13 See JAMES G. DWYER, ON THE SUPERIORITY OF YOUTH: MORAL STATUS AND
How WE TREAT CHILDREN (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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many people. But really it would seem unnecessary to argue the
point here, for there is no suggestion by the other participants in
the symposium, and I anticipate none from the journal's readers,
that children are not persons or that the state should treat
children as if they were property or appendages of their parents
rather than as morally distinct persons.
In fact, there would appear to be an "overlapping consensus"
among people from a broad range of moral outlooks on the
proposition that children, though not autonomous,1 4 are persons,
and on the assumption that children, though dependent upon
and psychologically and emotionally intertwined with their
parents and other family members, are morally distinct persons.
Such an overlapping consensus might itself constitute a basis for
state actors adopting those assumptions. That children occupy a
superior moral status is not widely believed, however, so I will
assume for the present just that children are equal persons
which means that state actors must afford them respect equal to
that given other persons, and must assign their interests weight
equal to that accorded interests of adults. This is not equivalent
to saying that children should be treated the same way adults
are treated, with all the same freedoms and responsibilities that
adults possess; in fact, because their interests differ in important
respects from those of adults, giving equal consideration to their
interests would require treating them differently in important
ways.
Therefore, if you, the reader, were a legislator contemplating
the situation of children in your jurisdiction who are being raised
by parents of greatly diverse ideological perspectives, you would
need to figure out what legal rights, if any, those children should
have with respect to their education given the assumption that
they are morally equal, yet non-autonomous, persons. To do
that, you must adopt some assumptions about what is good and
bad for them. You must make such assumptions with respect to
other aspects of their lives as well. For example, you must decide
whether whipping of or intercourse with a ten year-old child is
good or bad for him or her. On what basis would you decide such
things?
14 For the sake of simplicity I confine my analysis here to elementary school
aged children and put aside consideration of older children who are closer to being
autonomous.
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Importantly, no decision you reach on any aspect of
children's welfare is likely to be consistent with the preferences
of 100 percent of your constituents. Indeed, if there were no
inclination in any persons to do a certain thing to a child, there
would be no need for you, as a legislator, to make any decision
about it. And as to just about any aspect of children's lives, a
decision you make about what is good and bad will conflict with
preferences of some people that are grounded in religious belief.
As to just about every item in a state's child welfare laws and
regulations, one could find someone somewhere who says that his
or her religion commands doing what the law prohibits or not
doing what the law commands. So every decision you make as a
legislator about children's welfare is likely to conflict with
someone's sincere convictions. This is true of legal regulations
more generally, including others pertaining to family life, such as
restrictions on how spouses may treat each other, as well as laws
governing treatment of co-workers and employees, laws
prohibiting discrimination on various bases in public places, laws
concerning sexual freedom, and so forth. What are you to do?
One response to recognition of this problem would be to
create an exception to every rule for anyone who has a religious
objection, or any sort of ideological objection, or who simply does
not want to comply. This would, of course, eviscerate the rule to
a large degree, or completely, depending on the breadth of the
exception. At the extreme, it would mean laws apply only to
those who do not want to do what is proscribed anyway. More
importantly, it would be difficult to justify doing this in terms of
children's welfare. Because you cannot, as a state actor, adopt
the views of parents who object on religious grounds, nor assume
that their beliefs are true, you would need some other reason to
conclude that those children should not receive legal protection of
the interests that you assume, based on secular beliefs about the
world and human welfare, children typically possess. And this is
where your thinking as a legislator becomes philosophically
interesting. What reasons can you legitimately adopt for
sacrificing what you believe, based on empirical information
supplied to you by child welfare professionals and researchers, to
be an aspect of children's welfare?
One reason might be that you do not have great confidence
in your beliefs about children's welfare, perhaps because there is
not widespread consensus among those with secular views on the
208
THE LIBERAL STATE'S RESPONSE
subject. Child development scholars and researchers, or other
professionals, might disagree about whether a certain input into
children's lives is beneficial or whether a certain way of treating
them is harmful. There is substantial disagreement on secular
grounds, for example, about the use of phonics-based instruction
for reading, about the value of certain vaccinations for any
individual child, and about the wisdom of giving extraordinarily
active children suppressants like Ritalin.
I do not believe, however, that there is substantial
disagreement on secular grounds about the value for children of
any aspect of the liberal education I described above. In
particular, autonomy is quite widely regarded in our society as
an important good for humans. In fact, I doubt that those who
would oppose the kind of education I described would say that
autonomy in general is not good; they would likely claim that
they themselves are autonomous and so acknowledge that being
autonomous is a good thing. Many even couch their objection to
limitations on their childrearing choices, mistakenly, as a matter
of their autonomy. This is a mistaken, even conceptually
incoherent, claim because autonomy means self-determination,
and controlling another person's life, whether it is one's child or
one's spouse or one's neighbor, is not self-determination. There is
also widespread agreement among those operating from a secular
perspective on what sort of preparation is needed to attend the
better-regarded universities and to pursue various careers, and
on the negative consequences for girls, and boys, of being
subjected to sexist teaching."
Defenders of illiberal schooling practices might instead
contend that the need for their children, throughout their lives,
to believe the tenets of their parents' faith so that they can enjoy
whatever spiritual benefits come from being believers, is of
greater importance than the children's becoming autonomous or
being able to pursue professional careers or feeling free to reject
traditional gender roles. However, this is a position that you, as
a legislator, cannot share. There is no secular basis for
concluding that any person must hold a particular set of religious
beliefs throughout his or her life. Alternatively, they might
15 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 8-10; James G. Dwyer, The Children We
Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of
Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1332-38
(1996) (discussing the harm students incur from sexist instruction).
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contend that their preferred form of schooling is more conducive
to a child's becoming autonomous later in life than is what I have
described as a liberal education. This contention you, as a
legislator, would have to regard as implausible because it is
contrary to the prevailing views of educational theorists who
operate within a secular perspective and contrary to the
legislative findings underlying existing statutory and
administrative rules for the public schools that educate 90
percent of children. There can be reasonable disagreement on
secular grounds about some pedagogical details, such as the
precise age at which it is best to present children with particular
sorts of challenges, and everyone should be free to voice their
views about such things. However, there is no plausible basis for
contending that schooling with basic aims and orientation largely
or entirely antithetical to that described above is as conducive as
a liberal education to fostering autonomy and to affording
children with an equal opportunity to pursue careers and ways of
life consistent with their talents, abilities, and freely-endorsed
conception of the good. As I stated at the outset, the other
participants in the symposium appear to concede this by their
implicit or explicit valorizing of liberal education.
It bears emphasis here that the prescription for liberal
education that I outlined at the outset does not preclude religious
instruction, and in none of my writings have I suggested that no
school should be able to teach religion or that religious school
teachers or parents should themselves be prohibited from trying
to advance what they understand to be children's spiritual
interests. Rather, I concluded that the state, based on
suppositions about the temporal well-being of children, should
require every school to allow students some opportunity to
question religious teachings, in a respectful manner, if and when
the students become so inclined, and to foster critical thinking
skills in children more generally, using some subject matter for
that purpose but not necessarily religious instruction. 6 In fact,
in my second book, I argued that the state not only may, but
must provide financial assistance to religious schools-that is, to
schools that teach religious beliefs to students, as well as to other
private schools, so long as the schools are also providing secular
instruction in the standard subjects and providing other
16 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 180.
THE LIBERAL STATE'S RESPONSE
components of a liberal education, and so long as the funding
would be used to improve the secular components of the
education provided. 17 I based this argument not on supposed
rights of parents, as most proponents of school vouchers have
done, but rather on the equal protection rights of the children
whose parents place them in religious schools. I argued that the
state violates the rights of children in religious schools not only
by failing to exercise oversight of the schools' educational
practices, but also by denying these children a share of the state's
funding of education."8
Moreover, I did not include among the aims of liberal
education disabusing children of religious faith, but rather
included the aim of ensuring that all children would progress
toward autonomy and ultimately become capable of critically
examining their beliefs and making a free and informed decision
as to whether they would continue to hold the beliefs that their
parents and schools taught them. I know of no philosopher today
who denies that children need some set of beliefs and values
initially given to them, on the basis of which they can form an
initial self-conception and evaluate other beliefs and values. 9 I
did contend, however, that some religious beliefs are, from a
secular perspective, inherently bad for children to have instilled
in them-for example, a belief that females are morally or
socially inferior to males, or are less suitable than males for
positions of leadership or for the various professions. 20  The
reader can undoubtedly think of other examples of things that
the state should deem harmful to teach children. As such, I
suggested that ideally a liberal state would proscribe teaching
such beliefs to children altogether, though in practice it might be
counterproductive from a secular child welfare perspective to try
17 JAMES G. DWYER, VOUCHERS WITHIN REASON: A CHILD-CENTERED APPROACH
TO EDUCATION REFORM 161-63 (2002).
i" See id. at 159-67.
'9 See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF
MARRIAGE 15-29 (1999) (providing an account of how autonomy works, with a
person holding most of his or her values, beliefs, and commitments constant and
unquestioned-that is, taking an "internal stance" toward them-while subjecting
some subset of all his or her values, beliefs, or commitments to critical scrutiny-
that is, taking an "external stance" toward them). I am not familiar with the idea of
"radical autonomy" that Professor Smolin attacks.
20 See DWYER, supra note 17, at 12, 184-85.
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to enforce such a proscription, at least in the home, because it
would require too great an interference with family life.2'
I also contended, importantly, that allowing parents
extensive freedom to convey their religious beliefs to their
children when the children are not in school, and allowing
private schools substantial freedom to convey religious beliefs as
well, subject to the requirements noted above, creates more than
enough opportunity for parents and religious communities to
instill their beliefs and values in children. What a liberal
approach to child-rearing rules out are simply measures designed
to prevent children ever from questioning beliefs given to them
and from ultimately reaching their own independent conclusions
about matters of faith and value. Such measures include
preventing children from being exposed to views inconsistent
with those of their parents and warning children of dire
consequences, such as spending eternity in hell, for those who
reject the teachings of the parents' faith.
In view of the limited nature of the regulations I proposed for
private schools, and in light of the fact that less than 20 percent
of children's awake hours are spent in school, it is absurd to
suggest that the state regulation of curriculum and pedagogical
practices in private schools that I urged would amount to a state
monopoly over children's upbringing. What I recommended is
simply some effort on the part of the state to ensure that no
parents have a monopoly over their children's upbringing, that in
the less than 20 percent of their daily lives when children are in
school they receive some influence other than that of their
parents and their parents' religious community, and that they
receive instruction designed to foster a capacity to take an
external stance toward the beliefs and values impressed on them
by their parents and by other members of their parents'
community. This should include exposure to some range of
perspectives in our society that diverge from that of the parents,
presented in a way that encourages the students to see why
reasonable people might hold them and that challenges students
to evaluate the respective merits of various worldviews or specific
beliefs from a standpoint other than just their parents'
conception of the good or religious authority. Naturally, children
21 See id. at 11-12, 184-85.
22 See id. at 106-11.
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in public schools should have this experience as well, and I
regard it as a deficiency in the education many public schools
provide that it does not include teaching about religion in a
serious way.23 Again, though, it would be illogical to contend that
the state should not require private schools to provide an
autonomy-fostering education because not all public schools do it.
And it is also irrelevant whether many religious schools already
provide that sort of education; as long as some do not, the state
has reason to establish a legal requirement that all do so.
I have not yet considered, though, the most commonly
advanced argument against state efforts to regulate the practices
of religious schools to require the things that I said are
constitutive of liberal education. This is the argument that
parents are entitled to do what they want with their children
regardless of what legislators or so-called experts in child welfare
think is good or bad for the children. It is an argument many
parents and religious organizations have advanced in state and
federal courts in this country on the rare occasion when states
have attempted to require parents or private schools to do
something with respect to children's education that they did not
want to do.
Many people overstate the courts' responses to those
arguments, contending that the courts have established a
constitutional right of parents to depart from secular standards
of child rearing when their religious beliefs so require. The
courts have recognized that parents have a right to object on
their own behalf to state child welfare laws that conflict with
their religious beliefs, but have given effect to that right
principally, and exclusively at the Supreme Court level, when the
state could not, in the courts' view, show that the challenged laws
in fact served children's temporal welfare. Thus, in each of the
principal Supreme Court decisions striking down state education
laws or requiring that some parents be exempted from them-
Meyer v. Nebraska,24 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,25 and Wisconsin
v. Yoder 6-- the Court reasoned that enforcing the laws in
23 See Emile Lester, Gratitude and Parents' Rights over Their Children's
Religious Upbringing, 25 J. BELIEFS & VALUES 295, 297-98, 303-04 (2004); Emile
Lester, Religious Autonomy and World Religions Education, 31 RELIGION & EDUC.
62 (2004).
24 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
25 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
26 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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question served no legitimate state aim, because the states had
not shown that any harm would befall the children at issue if the
laws in question did not exist or were not applied to the parents
involved. 27  Even in Yoder-which many scholars treat as a
Magna Carta of parental free-exercise rights even though the
Court carefully limited its holding to the Amish-the Court
emphasized that parental freedom and power, even when tied to
religious belief, are constrained by what the state views as the
welfare of children.28 In contrast, in the two cases the Supreme
Court decided in which the state was able to show that the
challenged law did, from a secular perspective, protect children's
welfare-Prince v. Massachusetts29 and Jehovah's Witnesses v.
King County Hospital3 -the Court upheld the challenged law
and rejected the parental free exercise claim. Thus, Supreme
Court jurisprudence suggests that a parent's constitutional child-
rearing right operates only to resist application of laws that do
not serve children's welfare from a secular perspective, even
when parents object on the basis of religious belief. It does not
entitle parents to choose or act in ways the state deems contrary
to their children's welfare.
Nevertheless, many people might claim that parents have a
moral right against state regulation of the private schools that
parents choose, even if the schools engage in practices that the
state can show conflict with children's welfare as the state sees
it. Some parents might, out of religious conviction, disvalue
certain things the state believes all children should have-for
example, exercises designed to foster critical thinking and
instruction in gender equality. As to other things that the state
27 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-30, 233-34. 'This case, of course, is not one in
which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety,
peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred." Id. at
230; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (noting that nothing in the record indicated any
educational deprivation of students at private schools); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403
(concluding that a prohibition of German language instruction was "arbitrary and
without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state," because
"there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to
protect the child's health").
28 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34.
29 321 U.S. 158 (1944). "Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well-
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control .... [T]he state
has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child's welfare ..." Id. at 166-67.
30 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
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would require, some parents might see them as having some
value but might believe that value outweighed by spiritual
exigencies. For example, they might perceive some value in
children learning scientific methods as soon as they are able to
comprehend them, because they want their children to succeed
academically and to be able to pursue careers that require a
science background, but they might also perceive spiritual
danger in such instruction because they fear children will
develop an overly rationalistic outlook or will apply scientific
methods to deconstruct certain religious beliefs that have
scientific implications. Many people might say that such parents
are morally entitled to decide whether their children will receive
such instruction, based on the parents' own balancing of the
various interests they believe their children have, including
spiritual interests. Parents claim such an entitlement, not only
in connection with children's education, but also in connection
with children's health care and other aspects of children's lives.
In Religious Schools v. Children's Rights, I explained why
the very idea of parental child-rearing rights is wrong and why
the Supreme Court's creation of a constitutional parental right,
however limited, was a mistake from the outset.3' The
explanation rests on certain subtle, but important, distinctions.
Importantly, though, it does not rest on a belief that children
ought to be liberated from all governance or should be made
"creatures of the state." One important distinction is that
between exercising authority as a matter of one's own
entitlement and exercising authority and providing care for
another as a matter of privilege and in a fiduciary capacity. This
is a familiar distinction, one often applied to leadership positions,
including leadership positions within religious communities;
those in positions of power are said to be stewards, not entitled to
the offices they hold or to any powers attached to those offices
but rather called upon to serve as agents for those whom they
serve and/or for the higher authority that selected them for the
office. Professor Broyde draws this distinction and, significantly,
suggests that Jewish law conceptualizes the parental role with
respect to education as a fiduciary one.32 Another distinction is
between parents objecting to laws or to behavior by other persons
31 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 62-67.
32 See Michael J. Broyde, Why Educate?: A Jewish Law Perspective, 44 J. CATH.
LEGAL STUD. 179 (2005).
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with respect to children on the basis of the parents' own interests
and rights, on the one hand, and on the other hand, parents or
other agents objecting to laws or behaviors impacting children on
the basis of rights of the children. With respect to each
distinction, I argued that adopting the latter approach was
morally and legally requisite because of the moral and legal
standing of children as distinct persons.33
The first step in this argument was to show how entirely
anomalous parental control rights are. In every other area of life,
including the care of incompetent adults, our legal and moral
cultures reject the idea that any person is entitled to control the
life of another. We long ago rejected the idea that husbands are
entitled to control the lives of their wives. And even when
persons become caretakers for an elderly parent, or become or
remain caretakers for a mentally disabled offspring who has
passed the age of majority, we do not speak of those caretakers,
in law or in public discourse, as having a right-that is, an
entitlement in their own name-to decide what church the
incompetent adults will belong to or what medical care they will
receive. Rather, we speak of the caretakers as having authority
to make some decisions in behalf of their wards because, and only
because and to the extent that, it is in the best interests of the
persons cared for, from a secular perspective, that the caretakers
have that authority. And the law constrains that authority
within bounds established by the state's own judgment of the
incompetent adult's welfare. Thus, for example, if the law
mandated certain vaccinations for residents of nursing homes, we
would be taken aback by someone whose parent is a resident and
unable to make medical decisions for herself coming forward and
claiming that this law violates his-that is, the offspring's-
rights. We would think that person failed to understand
something very basic about the nature and purpose of rights.
And we see in court battles over medical care of incompetent
adults-for example, parental requests for sterilization of
mentally disabled daughters and parental requests to continue or
discontinue artificial life support for an adult offspring in a
persistent vegetative state-that the legal analysis and public
33 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 121-22.
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discussion attribute rights only to the incompetent adult and not
to her parents or other guardian.1
4
I extracted from various court opinions and philosophical
writings the moral reasoning underlying the rejection of other-
determining rights in contexts other than child rearing. The
reasoning was in part simply that, as a historical matter, the
posited moral basis for any of us having any legal rights is a
moral entitlement to personal integrity or self-determination, a
moral basis that does not encompass control over the body, mind,
or life course of another person. This puts the burden on
defenders of parental rights to demonstrate the moral
appropriateness of extending the concept of a right beyond the
scope of its historical moral justification, to demonstrate that
moral entitlements can arise on some grounds other than the
integrity of one's own self and control over just one's own life-
that is, one's own beliefs and decisions as to one's own career,
residence, attendance at religious services, and so forth.
Of course, the notion of parental rights also has a long
historical pedigree. The argument is that there is an
inconsistency in our cultural practices, an incompatibility
between our general principles concerning respect for persons
and concerning the nature of rights, on the one hand, and our
specific attitudes toward, and treatment of, children. It is
precisely by identifying and rectifying such incongruities between
general principles and specific practices that we have improved
ourselves as moral persons and as a moral community over the
centuries. This is, for example, how we eventually came to
embrace social and legal equality for African-Americans and for
women in this country; we recognized the contradictions in our
beliefs and behaviors. Rights of dominion over African-
Americans and women also seemed natural and divinely
ordained to people in this country at one time. Is treatment of
children as objects of others' rights another instance of an
indefensible inconsistency in our moral practices? Or is there a
good argument to be made for retaining this anomalous practice?
' See James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1416-20 (1994) (reviewing the
Supreme Court's treatment of incompetent adults and children); Elizabeth S. Scott,
Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy,
1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 821-22 (1986) (indicating that the parents' interests will not be
considered in protecting their mentally retarded child from an unwanted
pregnancy).
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Recall that any such argument would have to be addressed
to state actors, because the ultimate question is whether the law
should recognize a right of parents to control their children's
upbringing, a right that would operate to enable parents to act in
opposition to what state decision makers find to be conducive to
children's welfare. Why should a legislator or judge establish
such a right rather than embodying in the law only rights for
children themselves in connection with their education and other
aspects of their upbringing? Rights for children would be, at
least for young children, not choice-protecting rights-that is,
rights to decide for themselves what sort of school they would
attend-but rather interest-protecting rights, such as a right to a
form of schooling that satisfies their developmental interests.
Children's rights would likely entail assigning some decision-
making authority to parents because, and insofar as, this is
conducive to the children's welfare, but they would also likely
constrain parental authority in significant ways, just as they
constrain the authority of caretakers for incompetent adults.
What justification could legislators or courts have for conferring
rights on parents instead of on children in connection with
fundamental aspects of children's lives such as their education?
A few arguments are easily dismissed. One is that God says
it should be so. As noted above, state actors, while recognizing
that most citizens do believe in a god or gods, are not free to
make decisions themselves, in their official capacity, on the basis
of assumptions about what any one of those gods has
commanded. None of us should be comfortable with state actors
doing that even if today they are likely to do so on the basis of
what we believe God has said rather than on the basis of what
someone else believes God has said. Tomorrow it might be
otherwise, and today it would constitute too great a threat to the
sense of security and belongingness of some of our fellow citizens
and would be contrary to a proper respect for their equal
personhood. To avoid religious civil war, to facilitate harmonious
social interaction in an ideologically diverse world, and to respect
the equal standing of those who do not share our conception of
the good, we expect our legislators and judges to find more
neutral justifications for their decisions, and we believe that we
have found that in secular understandings of human welfare. No
one expects that this political principle will be fully satisfying to
all persons at all times, but liberal political theorists believe all
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reasonable persons should accept it as a compromise that is
better in a practical sense than the alternative of majoritarian
theocracy and that expresses the respect we should have for each
other as morally equal persons.
An argument somewhat akin to, and often "code" for, an
argument based on divine command is one based on natural law
or natural rights. Many people, recognizing that no one will be
persuaded if they base a claim on an assertion that "my god says
so," translate that assertion into one that "nature says so." There
is a large literature today on the validity of natural law or
natural rights claims. There are questions about what "nature"
means, how it speaks to us, and who is competent to interpret
what it says. The basis usually offered for discerning a command
of natural law, when religious authority is not appealed to, is
historical social practice or tradition, on the implicit assumption
that whatever practices have evolved are "natural" in some
sense.
Even if we concede some authority to history and tradition,
as moral agents we are expected to step back from what we have
done in the past and to reassess it, and doing so has led to what
we regard as moral progress over the centuries. As suggested
above, some practices and attitudes that most people in the
United States today regard as immoral-slavery and
subordination of women being standard examples-were once
defended as natural, as dictated by natural law and the natural
order of things, and were firmly grounded in tradition. So too
was instrumental and inhumane treatment of incompetent
adults. We have rejected specific beliefs and practices after
concluding that they were inconsistent with general principles
that themselves are the outgrowth of our collective history. Our
history does not reflect perfect moral consistency, because we are
not perfect beings. Part of our perceived mission in the world is
to achieve greater moral consistency, to advance each generation
in our moral understandings and in our ethics, rather than to
remain always at the level achieved by our forbearers, however
much we admire them. The claim here is that making children
the objects of others' rights, even if those others are loving
parents, is inconsistent with what we-including those attracted
to the idea of natural law-generally believe is entailed in
respecting the personhood of others.
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Another easily dismissed argument for making an exception
to general principles concerning rights in the case of parents
raising children is that children are incapable of possessing
rights because they are not autonomous. The reality today is
that children have many legal rights, just as incompetent adults
have many legal rights, and others can be and are given the legal
power to act in behalf of children to effectuate those rights. For
example, a newborn, like an elderly person who has lost his
mental capacity and like a mentally handicapped adult, can hold
property rights. And, in fact, many state laws speak of children
having a right to an education. Moreover, talk of children having
moral rights of various sorts is quite common, even among those
who are proponents of strong parental rights. So a defense of
parental rights cannot rest on a supposition that someone needs
rights against state action impacting children and that children
themselves cannot be the bearers of those rights. They can be,
and in contexts other than parental objections to state child-
rearing norms they are viewed as such.35
Thus, whatever protections there need to be for children's
interests can be embodied in rights for children themselves. This
belies the most common argument for parents' rights-namely,
that they are necessary to protect children's interests. Any
interests the state perceives children to have it can protect by
recognizing a right of the children and by authorizing certain
persons, such as parents or guardians ad litem, to assert those
rights in legal forums. If parents believe a particular regulation
applied to private schools is contrary to their children's well-
being, they should be able to go to court and assert that the state
is violating their children's rights because the regulation is
contrary to certain of their children's interests. The difficulty for
many parents, though, would be in identifying interests of their
children that a court could deem to exist and that are connected
with their-the parents'-religious beliefs. They would need to
convince a court to accept that the children have certain interests
even if the court does not itself adopt, as it must not, the parents'
religious beliefs. They would need to have some non-religious
foundation for ascribing certain interests to their children, and
perhaps to children in general.
" I present a more extended analysis of this issue in a forthcoming book, JAMES
G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (forthcoming 2006).
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But what if the only interests of their children that they
believe are threatened are spiritual interests? I have said that
the state cannot assume that children have particular spiritual
interests, because that would require the state to assume the
truth of particular religious beliefs, which means that the state
cannot create rights for children designed to protect particular
spiritual interests. But if children do have spiritual interests,
how are they to be served? For the state to ignore them entirely
could result in state action that harms those interests. Is that
what liberalism requires, that what might be children's most
vital interests are put at serious risk by making the state act as
if it is agnostic about religious belief? Or must it allow parents to
define those interests and to direct children's lives accordingly?
These are not easy questions, and I think Professor
Scaperlanda underestimates the difficulty in answering them.
He assumes that children do have spiritual interests, and
spiritual interests of a particular sort, without explaining why
the state should agree with him or should assume that (all?)
parents are correct in their own views about children's spiritual
interests, a view that would be incoherent or radically
relativistic. He leaps too readily from the premise that children
do have spiritual interests, and from the premise that the state
cannot fulfill children's spiritual needs, to the conclusion that
parents are entitled to define and to act as they see fit to fulfill
such needs. And he offers us no way to think about the bounds of
parental entitlement. Yet presumably he and Professor Smolin,
like all other defenders of parental free exercise rights whom I
have encountered, believe there must be some bounds, that
parents should not be entitled to do absolutely whatever they
believe to be required by divine command. Defenders of such
rights usually throw out some vague standard like "grievous
harm," "excessive harm," or "unreasonable conduct" to define
their position on permissible legal restrictions on parental child-
rearing freedom. They not only decline to give enough content to
the standard to make it meaningful, but they also decline to
provide any normative basis for imposing any standard or
limitation. Who says what is harmful? Who says how much
harm is grievous or excessive? Who balances such supposed
harm against what the parents believe are the child's spiritual
interests? Who says what is reasonable? One sometimes gets
the impression that advocates for parental religious rights
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believe they themselves, and they alone, are in a position to
decide such matters. It is not so simple.
Suppose, for example, that the state petitioned to terminate
the parental rights of Abraham after learning that he had
prepared to burn to death his son Isaac. The state assumes on
secular grounds that it is in Isaac's interests to stay alive and not
to feel that his life is constantly in danger because his father's
god might change its mind and command that Abraham go
through with the killing next time. Today, in the real world, in
the United States, preparing to burn one's child to death would
certainly lead state authorities to remove the child from one's
custody, and it would likely lead to termination of parental rights
absent strong evidence that one was firmly committed to never
again pursue such an aim regardless of what one might believe
one's god has commanded.
But suppose Abraham defends himself by saying not just
that God commanded him to kill Isaac and that he himself would
have suffered divine retribution if he had disobeyed, which is the
only motivation apparent from the Old Testament account,36 but
also that he believed that Isaac would be better off if God's
command were obeyed-for example, that God would give Isaac
eternal bliss in heaven if Abraham sacrificed him. Furthermore,
Abraham says he would only kill Isaac in the future if he
believed that to be true, because he loves Isaac very much and
would never do anything he thought harmful to Isaac. How
should the state respond to this defense? Many proponents of
parental religious rights cite religiously-motivated killing of
children, or allowing children to die from curable illness, as
examples of something they would legally prohibit, and I suspect
most would endorse the existing rule, as described above, which
would likely result in the removal of Isaac and termination of
Abraham's parental rights. But why? Why should the state
elevate what it believes to be the secular interests of the child
above what the parent believes to be the child's spiritual
interests in this or any other type of case? If it does so in this
case, why not also when what is at issue is whether girls
attending religious schools learn that they are as good in every
36 See Genesis 22:1-19 (New American). Indeed, this account creates an
impression of remarkable callousness on the part of Abraham with respect to his
son's life.
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way as boys and can pursue any occupations and roles in life that
they wish?
The two cases cannot be distinguished on the basis of
societal consensus-that is, on the basis of an assertion that
there is a consensus in our society today that killing children is
bad but not a consensus on gender equality. Many laws and
regulations, including regulations governing the public schools
that educate 90 percent of the nation's children, reflect a
consensus concerning gender equality.37 The same is true of
autonomy-promoting education. Those who oppose these things
are a small minority. So head counting is not a promising route
for those who would defend a parental right to exemption from
such education regulations but not a parental right to exemption
from legal prohibitions on endangering children's lives.
Certainly universal acceptance cannot be the general standard
for legal regulation of conduct, for then, as noted above, religious
objectors should have an exemption not only to every legal rule
about parents' treatment of their own children but also to laws
designed to protect children who are not in one's custody and
laws designed to protect other adults, including spouses, co-
workers, pregnant women, and so forth.3"
This last point suggests another distinction that defenders of
parental religious rights must make-namely, between one's
views about the spiritual interests of children in one's custody
and one's views about the spiritual interests of anyone else in the
world. I am not entitled to define my neighbor's spiritual
interests, or my co-workers' spiritual interests, or even my
spouse's spiritual interests, and on that basis to command an
exemption from generally applicable laws restricting my
treatment of those people. It is not sufficient, to make this
distinction, to point out that my neighbors, co-workers, and
spouse are able to determine their own spiritual interests. First,
it is also true with respect to incompetent adults that no one else,
not even their guardians, is deemed entitled to define their
spiritual interests and to have the law accommodate the
" See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1332-38 (reviewing statutory provisions that
promote equality among students).
" With respect to abortion, there are good arguments to be made that women
should not be able to do it-especially arguments appealing to the rights of unborn
children-but what is universally recognized not to be a good argument is: "I
personally am entitled to stop women from doing this because my religion commands
me to do so."
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conclusions reached about that. Second, my neighbor's newborn
child is also not able to determine his or her own spiritual
interests, so why should I not be entitled to do so, and on that
basis determine, for example, whether the child will receive
vaccinations? Third, other competent adults could be wrong
about their own spiritual interests, or might, like a newborn
child, simply never think about spiritual interests. Why would I
not have a right to decide for them if either of those things is true
or if I believe either to be true?
The only practical and potentially relevant differences
between a child in one's custody, who might or might not be one's
biological offspring, and most of these other categories of people,
are that the child is in one's possession and one has legal
obligations to that child as a result of that possession, that
entrustment. The latter cannot suffice to support objections to
state regulation of parenting, however, because the essence of
those claims is a request to be exempted from certain legal
obligations, and it makes no sense to say that one is entitled to
depart from one's legal obligations toward one's child because one
has legal obligations to the child. The fact that one is under legal
duties is a basis for demanding freedom from interference in
carrying out those legal duties, but not a basis for insisting that
one should not have those duties. What about a claim on the
basis of moral obligations? Well, in effect, parents' legal
obligations reflect a legislative judgment about the moral
obligations parents owe to children, or, in other words, about the
moral rights of the children. So a parental-rights argument
founded on the parents' view of their moral obligation is an
argument that the state should accept the parents' moral outlook
in the specific case of their children. And that just begs the
question of why the state should adopt or defer to individual
parents' views, particularly where the parents' moral outlook is
contrary to what the state believes to be the moral rights of the
child.
Here one might object that my reasoning rests on a
supposition that the state, while eschewing any authority to
decide religious questions and remaining agnostic about religious
beliefs, is competent to decide moral questions. Moral beliefs are
also contested and, in fact, many believe, must be grounded in
religious belief. There seems something illicit in relying in one
part of my argument on state neutrality with respect to religion
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and in another part relying on state judgments about moral
rights and duties. Here is how I would respond to this seeming
inconsistency: First, I would point out that a great number of our
laws rest on these two suppositions even though they stand
somewhat in tension with each other-that is, that the state may
not adopt or endorse religious beliefs, and that the law should
embody moral beliefs. Racial discrimination is unlawful because
it violates the moral rights of individuals, not because it is
contrary to the Bible per se. Women are legally entitled to
pursue careers outside the home even after marrying, because
they have a moral right to do so regardless of what the Bible or
the Koran might have to say about that.
Second, I would suggest that state conclusions about moral
rights and duties emerge from perceiving an overlapping
consensus among people holding diverse conceptions of the good,
a consensus around principles that can be explained in terms of
shared values like happiness, autonomy, and respect for
personhood that are generally viewed today as not requiring
reference to religious texts or divine authority for their
legitimacy and force. At the same time, the state must
sometimes reject more specific beliefs about moral rights and
duties, even when they are widely held, because they are
inconsistent with more general widely-held moral principles.
That is what I suggested above must be done in defining the
respective rights of children and parents. The more general
principle that no person should be made the object of another's
rights, a principle that we today apply even to non-autonomous
persons who are adults, I have argued, should be applied also to
children. At the most basic level, the state and private parties
should treat every person as an end in himself or herself, and not
as an instrument for the expression or gratification of others, no
matter how well intentioned those others are.
Thus, even if one assumes that parents' possession of, and
obligations with respect to, children make child rearing
distinguishable from all other situations, the argument for
parents' rights based on parents' legal and moral obligations
fails. But these facts actually do not distinguish child rearing
from every other context considered above, because incompetent
adults can also be in the possession and care of others, including
their legal parents. Yet, as noted, in that context we have
collectively rejected the idea that persons cared for should be
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viewed and treated as objects of others' rights. We view
incompetent adults themselves as rights holders in connection
with their care and the course of their lives, and we view their
caretakers as fiduciaries.
Parents' rights thus cannot be defended as necessary to
protect the interests of children. Arguments for parents' rights
based on interests of persons other than the children also fail.
Parents' own interests are insufficient, just as the interests
anyone might have in dictating the life of other persons who are
not their children, no matter how strong those interests, do not
justify assigning them other-determining rights. I might believe
that I have as great an interest in dictating the course of my
elderly parents' life or the life of my neighbor's children or the
actions of pregnant women as I have in directing the lives of my
daughters. Yet a claim for a right based on those interests would
be a non-starter in our legal and moral culture today, no matter
how much I have given to or sacrificed for the person whose life I
wish to control. To make others objects of my rights in order to
serve my interests would be clearly to treat them instrumentally,
contrary to the respect they are owed as persons. The same is
true of arguments based on supposed societal interests such as
diversity. For the state to act to sacrifice what it views as the
welfare of individual children in order to serve such corporate
interests would also treat the children instrumentally and
therefore morally inappropriately. We competent adults would
surely be offended if someone suggested giving others a right of
control over our lives in order to serve such societal aims, even if
the right would arise only if and when we became unable to
direct our own lives.
39
In sum, defenders of parental entitlement, as distinguished
from a parental privilege to exercise authority for the
furtherance of children's welfare and rights, need to supply a
plausible argument for such an entitlement that would not, if its
premises were generalized, also justify giving some persons an
entitlement to control the lives of others who are not their
children. The things people ordinarily think of as justifying
parental rights-children's dependency, parents' sacrifices and
sense of responsibility, and the value of diversity-would apply
'9 I also reject the empirical claim that entitling parents to choose illiberal
schools for their children is conducive to diversity. See DWYER, supra note 3, at 97-
99.
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equally to some other categories of persons with respect to whom
we have rejected the idea that others are entitled to direct their
lives. The closest analogy is to incompetent adults, as to whom
we have adopted a fiduciary, rather than an ownership or
entitlement, model of care giving.
There is still the very large question of what content the
state should give to children's rights. Many parents might accept
the idea that child rearing should be about their children's
interests and rights, not their own, and might accept that they
should think less about what is owed to them-which would be
the corollary of their having rights-and more about what they
owe to their children. Yet they might insist that they are in the
best position to identify their children's interests and so to give
content to their children's rights. They know their children
intimately, and they love their children like no one else does.
The state, on the other hand, is a stranger to their children. How
can it be consistent with a concern for children to give an
impersonal stranger a substantial role in shaping their lives?
I addressed this question to some extent above, in discussing
children's spiritual interests. Here I will elaborate further on
that issue and address some others as well. There are several
points to be made in response to the "parents know best" line of
reasoning. First, as noted above, no one seriously maintains that
the state should not set the parameters of parental freedom.
This is in part because everyone knows that not all parents love
their children enough to refrain from acting in ways that the
parents themselves know is harmful to the children.
Second, the claim that parents know their children best is
overstated. It is true that most parents are more familiar with
the individual personalities of their children and with the past
events of their children's lives than is anyone else. But many
aspects of children's welfare are generic or nearly so-that is,
certain things are true of all or most children. Thus, knowledge
of those aspects of children's well-being does not depend on
intimacy. In fact, many generic aspects of children's lives are
known only by people who have devoted an extraordinary
amount of time, even their entire careers, to learning about
them. This is true of much of children's development and health.
It would be a rare parent indeed who was not only an expert with
respect to her children's personalities and histories, but also with
respect to developmental psychology, educational theory,
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medicine, and nutrition. With respect to each major area of
children's lives, it seems safe to say that the vast majority of
parents know quite little. Very few parents know as much about
how to educate children as do professional educators, and most
parents implicitly recognize this by seeking schools for their
children that employ well-trained and credentialed teachers.
Very few parents know as much about health care as do doctors.
The state has agencies that employ and draw information from
people whose careers are devoted to studying children's welfare,
including their cognitive development, and it is largely for that
reason that we repose some trust in state agencies to establish
minimum requirements for care and treatment of children.
Third, what is typically at stake in religiously-charged
controversies over child rearing is not parental love or parental
knowledge; rather, it is ideology and a clash of religious and
secular values. Reference to parental love and knowledge is
impertinent in these situations. The state's objection to certain
illiberal practices is not that it believes that the parents do not
love their children, nor that the parents are ignorant; it is that
those practices are harmful to the children from a secular
perspective and that the parents are not entitled to say that their
religious perspective must control. If one accepts the explanation
above as to why the very idea of parents' rights is misguided, one
must, in order to defend the claim that the parents' religious
perspective must control, explain why children have a right to
that outcome. The state's position might be understood to assert
that children have a right to protection of their secular interests
until they become adults capable of deciding for themselves what
religious beliefs, if any, they will hold, and what role any such
beliefs will play in their lives, including whether they will
sacrifice what is generally believed to be in their secular interests
for the sake of religious duty or spiritual aspiration. Those who
reject this position need to construct an argument to the effect
that children have a right to have their secular interests
sacrificed for the sake of what their parents believe to be
required by religious command. And that argument needs to be
one the state can accept and would find convincing, for as noted
above, what religious objectors to state regulation of child rearing
are demanding is not state inaction, but rather state action of a
particular sort-namely, a state conferral on them of more
extensive power over children's lives. I am not aware that
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anyone has ever attempted to construct such an argument, and I
very much doubt that it can successfully be done.
One way to think about the content of children's rights that I
find helpful is to imagine what rules I would want to apply to my
situation if I were told that tomorrow I would be born again, in
the temporal sense that I would start all over in my human life
as a newborn child, and if I did not know anything else about my
individual circumstances-in particular, not knowing who among
the vast number of potential parents in our society would become
my legal parents. The parents I will have could be people
belonging to any one of the tremendous variety of religious
denominations in America, people who have a very individualized
set of religious beliefs, people who have no religious beliefs, or
people who are atheistic. They could be Satanists or sun-
worshippers, people who believe that one should eat nothing but
lettuce, or people who believe children grow spiritually through
sexual intercourse with adults. In light of the enormous variety
of possibilities, how would I want the state to go about deciding
what the limits of parental power and freedom should be in the
world I am about to reenter?
I believe this thought experiment would lead to a conclusion
that the state should rely on widely shared secular views of
children's welfare or interests, but not on any particular religious
beliefs per se. Unless one ascribes to a view that every child just
has whatever interests are specified by the conception of the good
of his or her parents, or that all efforts to identify interests of
children are futile, one would want to guard against the
possibility that the parents to whom one is assigned have beliefs
inconsistent with one's interests. Everyone involved in these
debates concedes this possibility when thinking about religious
practices that seriously threaten children's health or safety, but
without explanation, some refuse to acknowledge that the same
possibility exists with respect to children's schooling. I believe
that anyone reading this essay who thinks seriously about the
prospect of reentering the world and being assigned to parents of
unknown ideological outlook-parents whose beliefs could
diverge widely not only from secular views about children's
welfare but also from any religious beliefs the reader now holds-
will come to endorse a legal regime in which the state adopts the
prevailing secular views concerning children's temporal welfare
2005] 229
230 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 44:195
and imposes on all parents restrictions on their child-rearing
choices that reflect such views.4 °
That thought experiment is designed to model the reality of
every newborn child today, to facilitate our putting ourselves in
the place of each person who is actually entering the world now.
It encourages us to see each newborn child as a morally distinct
and equal person and to recognize the great hazard the state
creates for children now by assigning them to parents adhering
to any one of a vast variety of conceptions of the good without
constraining in a significant way parental choices regarding
children's intellectual, psychological, and emotional development.
Another useful thought experiment might be to imagine that
your own children, or your own nephews and nieces are, for some
reason-for example, a family tragedy-randomly reassigned to
another set of parents in our society-for example, through the
adoption process. How comfortable would you be with the
thought that they could be assigned to fundamentalist Muslims,
fundamentalist Christians, parents in a cult like the Branch
Davidians, members of the Ku Klux Klan, or parents adhering to
any other lifestyle and ideological view? Would you not want the
state to impose some restrictions and requirements with respect
to their upbringing, including the kind of education they receive,
to at least ensure that they will develop the capacity to question
the beliefs their parents instill in them and perhaps also to
ensure that they are prepared-even if they are girls-to pursue
whatever careers are well suited to their native talents and
abilities and self-chosen values?
I will close by reiterating that ensuring every child a liberal
education would not amount to standardizing children. Those
adults who attended public schools ought to resent the frequent
suggestion that state influence on education results in children
being standardized, their individuality expunged. In addition, in
and of itself, imposing certain requirements on private schools
has no implications for children's home life or for the freedom of
parents to teach and model their beliefs and values. Again, the
experience of the 90 percent of adults in this country who
attended public schools is telling; the vast majority describe
40 I develop this line of reasoning, which was inspired by John Rawls's idea of
deciding on basic principles for a society behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance as to
one's individual characteristics, more fully in chapter 6 of Religious Schools v.
Children's Rights. See DWYER, supra note 3, at 148-77.
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themselves as religious, and I have never heard of any who
complained that they were deprived of the opportunity to have a
religious upbringing insulated from liberal ideas and secular
views and values. In fact, Catholic parents are increasingly
comfortable sending their children to public schools, believing
that their children can still have a Catholic upbringing, can still
learn the tenets of the Catholic faith, and can still live their lives
as Catholics, because these parents recognize that they still
control most of their children's daily lives and still have the
opportunity to spend a great amount of time instructing their
children and modeling their beliefs. I have argued simply that no
parent is entitled to complete control over children's intellectual
development and that children cannot plausibly be said to have a
right that their parents have such complete control. Rather,
every child has a moral right that at least this one limited aspect
of their lives-their schooling-be governed by liberal principles
whether or not their parents accept those principles.
I am not aware of any religion whose basic precepts are
inherently opposed to this position. I would be very interested to
see a theological analysis within the religious traditions
addressed by the other contributors or any other tradition of
what adherents should believe about the respective authority of
parents and the rest of society, as represented by the state, over
child rearing, and of what specific restrictions the state ought to
impose on parental freedom, if they accepted certain of the
assumptions and conclusions relied on above-for example, that
children are neither property nor appendages of their parents,
that children's separate personhood gives rise to some moral
obligations both on the part of parents and on the part of the
state, that some parents manifest little love for their children,
that most parents are not experts regarding many aspects of
child rearing, that the state cannot be expected to adopt any
parent's religious beliefs or assume that such beliefs are true,
and that the beliefs parents in our society have about what God
commands and about the spiritual interests of their children are
infinitely varied and in some cases directly contrary to
empirically supported secular views about children's welfare. It
is not obvious to me, based on my limited understanding of
various faiths, that such an analysis would necessarily lead in
many instances to conclusions much different from my own.
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